
MEMORANDUM

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL



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SECRET/SENSITIVE

February 22, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR:

MR. KISSINGER

MORI/CDF C05082449

25X1

FROM:

JOHN HOLDRIDGE JHH

T. C. PINCKNEY pp

SUBJECT:

Laos Ceasefire Violations Paksong

At Tab B is a message from Ambassador Godley reporting preparation of targets for 3 B-52 cells.

State Dept. review completed

ON-FILE NSC RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS APPLY

SECRET/SENSITIVE DECLAS: 12-31-81

T.C. Pinckney cys: to: Scowcraft v Holdudge SECRET/SENSITIVE No Objection to Declassification in Part 2009/11/13 : LOC-HAK-452-6-4-9

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

WSAG PAPER

22 February 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR:

The Honorable Henry A. Kissinger Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

The Honorable William J. Porter Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Honorable William P. Clements, Jr. Deputy Secretary of Defense

Admiral Thomas H. Moorer Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT:

Lao Cease-fire Violations by North Vietnamese at Paksong in Laos

in which the North Vietnamese Army was attacking in strength subsequent to the cease-fire. The Lao Groupe Mobile 33 was reportedly falling back and no tactical air was available to support his troops. At approximately 12:15 hours on 22 February 1973, following the commencement of the cease-fire in Laos, a large enemy force estimated to be in excess of one battalion launched an attack against the irregulars defending Paksong town and the intensity of the attack forced withdrawal of all elements of Groupe Mobile 33 which had been defending the town.

states that Groupe Mobile 33 and his troops are fully engaged with the North Vietnamese, and that without tactical air support, there is no way that they can hold. He feels that if the North

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WARNING NOTICE SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

SECRET/SENSITIVE EYES ONLY

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			further advises that he is sending Souvanna Pho	oum <sup>25</sup>
50 UTA	3. ent redu	est that he	advise President Nixon that the North Vietnam	ese
are no	t adheri	ng to the t	erms of the cease-fire and requesting continued	
u.s.	tacair s	upport.		
		<u> </u>	is convinced that unless U. S. tacair support	25
ic fort	4.	the alre	ady poor morale of his forces will further	
deteri	orate an	d they will	collapse completely.	
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			Cool Mayar cfrs)	
			Thomas H. Karamessines	
			Deputy Director for Plans	
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## TS-HK 1153

\*\*\*\*\*\* TOP SECRET \*\*\*\*\*

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FM VIENTIANE

TO WHITE HOUSE EYES ONLY DR. KISSINGER

TOPSECRET 221600Z FEB 73 VIA CAS CHANNELS

EXDA: AMBASSADOR GODLEN, YIENTIANE 725

TO:

FLASH - THE WHITE HOUSE FOR DR. KISSINGER - EYES MALY AT 10:15 THIS EVENING I SAW SOUVANNA WHO WAS INCENSED AT CHASE FIRE VIOLATIONS THROUGHOUT LAGS BY THE N.V.A. HE ASKED IF WE COULD HELP. I READ HIM YOUR MESSAGE WHOMOTO AND HE SAID HE CERTAINLY WANTED SOME B-52 STRIKES IN THE PAK SONG AREA.

OUR TARGETTING IS COMPLICATED IN THAT THE ERIENDLY POSITIONS ARE NOT CLEARLY DEFINED. WE WILL HOWEVER SEND TO GENERAL VOGT INFO YOU, JCS, SAC, CINCPAC, B CELLS IN THAT AREA THAT APPEAR TO BE REST SUITED TO INDICATE TO THE ENEMY THAT HE HON!T HAVE A EREF RIDE. TO EXPEDITE MATTERS I AM SENDING A COPY OF YOUR WHBOOTS EYES ONLY TO GENERAL VOGT AS WELL AS A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE. IT WILL TAKE US SOME THE TO GET THE TARGETS TO GENERAL VOGT BUT WE WILL OF OUR UTWEST.

AS EVER.

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